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CRAFTING STRUCTURAL TAX 
LEGISLATION IN A HIGHLY  
POLARIZED CONGRESS 
GEORGE K. YIN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
To the surprise of many, Congress passed a major tax reform bill at the very 
end of 2017.1 Skeptics had doubted this result because of the failure of many 
earlier tax reform efforts, Congress’s inability to replace or repeal the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA)—or pass any other major legislation—in 2017, and the 
incredible incompetence (and dishonesty) of the Trump Administration 
generally. But doubters overlooked the tremendous amount of pressure exerted 
by Republican donors not to waste completely the opportunity provided by 
Republican control of the White House and both houses of Congress. Doubters 
may also have underestimated the strength of Republican interest in changing 
tax policy relating to businesses with cross-border income. 
The new tax bill is highly complex for many reasons, including especially the 
hasty and secretive manner in which Congress considered it. The focus of this 
essay is on a category of tax legislation, termed “structural” legislation, which is 
complex for a different reason. Structural legislation tries to protect the integrity 
and existing policy objective of various networks of tax rules that are part of the 
tax system. The legislation is complicated because the networks are intricate and 
any change may affect, and be affected by, all of the other rules in the network. 
Examples include changes to many of the provisions in subchapters S, K, and C 
of the Internal Revenue Code. Although major tax reform may also be complex 
in part because of structural elements that carry out its policy changes, this article 
is concerned with structural legislation that is not part of a major reform. Rather, 
the legislation merely maintains the sound operation and policy objectives of 
existing law. Both old and new structures can benefit from having functional 
plumbing. 
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 1.  See Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). “Tax reform” is a misnomer for this bill in view of 
the complications and distortions it adds to the law. 
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Changes in the tax legislative process have made it increasingly difficult to 
enact structural legislation that is not a component of major reform. Somewhat 
ironically, because such legislation’s policy objectives are more modest than 
those of major reform, it may actually be harder to develop and pass in today’s 
environment. Successfully crafting such legislation requires knowledge of the 
network of rules affected, sensitivity to the interactions of those rules, and respect 
for their overall policy objective, but without the impetus of a major change in 
policy. It is an example of hard, non-sexy, “good government” legislation that 
“merely” improves the execution of current policies by advancing the efficiency, 
equity, or administrability of existing law. 
Prior analysts who have attempted to connect the process and product of tax 
legislation have sometimes ignored the details of process or considered product 
only on a bill-by-bill basis. This article partly disaggregates both process and 
product by considering the professional staff who actually craft tax legislation and 
subdividing such legislation into a few major categories. The purpose of 
disaggregation is to show that a decline in the production of structural legislation 
may be a natural outgrowth of changing legislator and staff interests and 
incentives during the past twenty-five to thirty years. 
Part II of this essay reviews some important changes in Congress and its staff 
principally over the last twenty-five to thirty years. Part III then introduces an 
additional important variable—the changing composition of the professionals 
working on tax legislation—and considers the impact of all of the changes on the 
production of structural legislation. Part IV illustrates the hypothesis by 
examining amendments to subchapters S, K, and C of the Code as well as efforts 
to codify the federal statutes as positive law, and part V concludes. 
II 
CHANGES IN CONGRESS AND ITS STAFF 
Subpart A describes four major changes in Congress that have occurred over 
recent periods: an increased ideological division between the parties but cohesion 
within them, the growing costs of campaigning, an increased external focus of 
Congress, and a more centralized management structure. Subpart B then 
identifies changes in the number, composition, and workplace of congressional 
staff. 
A. Some Major Changes in Congress 
1. Increased Ideological Division Between Parties but Cohesion Within 
Them 
Figure 1 illustrates an increased ideological division between the parties in 
the House over approximately the last twenty-five years. 
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Fig. 1: Ideological Positions—Representatives, by Party, 1947–20142 
 
The figure draws on a widely used annual measure developed by two political 
scientists to rate the ideological preferences of every member of Congress based 
on their votes during the prior year.3 The scores range from “+1,” representing 
the most conservative members, to “-1,” representing the most liberal. A score 
of “0” represents a centrist. 
As the two solid lines show, the ideological distance between the generally 
conservative Republicans and the generally liberal Democrats in the House 
remained roughly the same from 1947 to around 1990. But since then, the 
separation between them has grown. Both parties have contributed to the 
increase, although the Republicans have contributed more. 
This figure only shows the average ideology of all House Democrats and 
Republicans. Within that average, there might be a considerable range of views. 
But, in general, that appears not to have been the case. Since the early 1970s, 
members of both the House and Senate have increased their levels of party 
loyalty by voting in accordance with their party’s positions.4 In early 2017, 
 
 2.  Vital Statistics on Congress, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/multi-
chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress [https://perma.cc/68LY-R8CW] (follow “Click here to access 
the Vital Statistics data tables” hyperlink; then download the data tables for tbl.8-7).  
 3.  See Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 29 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 357 (1985) (explaining development of DW-Nominate). The data for most figures is 
from Vital Statistics on Congress, supra note 2. For data limitations, see Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional 
Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1699–1702 (2015). 
 4.  See STEVEN S. SMITH ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 120 Figure 4.8 (9th ed. 2015). Party 
unity, however, is not necessarily the same as ideological unity. It is possible that even as party unity 
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Congressional Quarterly (CQ) reported that during the 114th Congress (2015-
16), when House Republicans had their largest majority in eighty-six years, they 
were also the most unified they have ever been since CQ began tracking party 
unity in 1956.5 House Democrats also had a near record party unity during that 
Congress. The increased ideological separation of the parties, but apparent 
cohesion within them, have heightened partisanship in Congress in the sense that 
party labels represent sharply distinct policy views.6 
Figure 1 also includes two dashed lines representing the ideological views of 
the Republicans and Democrats serving on the House Ways and Means 
Committee. The lines show that since around the early 1990s, the ideology of the 
Ways and Means Republicans has basically tracked the positions of their 
Republican House colleagues. The ideology of Ways and Means Democrats, 
however, has been more liberal than their Democratic colleagues. As a result, 
since the early 1990s, members of the two parties have been ideologically more 
different on the Ways and Means Committee than in the entire House.7 
The solid lines in Figure 2 show much the same trend in the Senate. There is 
increased ideological separation between the parties beginning around 1995 with 
Republicans contributing more than Democrats. The dashed lines show the 
ideological views of Senate Finance Committee Republicans and Democrats. 
During certain periods—between 1947–1965, the early 1980s, and 1995–2005 for 
the Democrats, and during the 1980s and early 1990s for the Republicans—
members of the Finance Committee played the role of centrists in that they were 
less liberal or conservative than their average Senate colleagues of the same 
party. As a result, during certain prior periods, the ideological division between 
members of the Finance Committee was less than that for the chamber as a 
whole. Overall, however, since the early 1990s, the ideological split of Finance 
Committee Republicans and Democrats has grown, consistent with the general 
 
increases, ideological unity might decrease if a growing number of members of a given party take 
ideological positions at variance from the orthodox party position. There might then be failed legislative 
efforts (without votes) on some initiatives and successful ones (based on strict party-line votes) on most 
or all others (the ones counted in the party unity measure). The divisions exhibited by congressional 
Republicans in 2017 on issues such as replacing the Affordable Care Act may be a recent indication of 
this phenomenon. 
 5.  See 2016 Vote Studies: House GOP More Unified Than Ever, CQ MAG. (Feb. 6, 2017), 
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport115-000005034993; Farina, supra 
note 3, at 1694 (reporting that in 2013, there were only four Representatives and no Senators who 
occupied the space between the most liberal Republican and most conservative Democrat, compared to 
344 and 58, respectively, in 1982). 
 6.  See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 166 (5th ed. 2017) (“Intense partisan 
polarization is the single most salient characteristic of contemporary politics and one that increasingly 
shapes the legislative process[.]”); William A. Galston & Pietro S. Nivola, Delineating the Problem, in 1 
RED AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS 1, 16 
(Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006).  
 7.  The figure shows that the members of the Ways and Means Committee have been ideologically 
more different than their House colleagues during earlier periods as well, although the gap between them 
was not as great as in recent years. 
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trend in the Senate. 
Fig. 2: Ideological Positions—Senators, by Party, 1947–20148 
2. Growing Costs of Campaigning 
The next figures illustrate the increased cost of campaigning during the last 
forty years. 
 
 
 8.  Vital Statistics on Congress, supra note 2, tbl.8-8. 
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Fig. 3: Average House Campaign Expenditures, 1974–2014 (in 2014 dollars)9 
 
Figure 3 shows the average campaign expenditures of House candidates since 
1974, as measured in 2014 dollars. Three groups are presented. The dotted line is 
the average expenditure of all major party candidates in all House races. This 
figure includes uncompetitive races, including ones with unopposed candidates, 
where campaign expenses may have been quite low. The dashed line represents 
the same information but only for open seat races that generally are competitive. 
Finally, the solid line shows the information only for incumbents who ended up 
with less than 60% of the vote and were, therefore, in reasonably competitive 
races. The last group thus excludes the expenditures of poorly financed 
challengers. The trend in each case is essentially straight up, with the average 
expenditure of incumbents in competitive races in 2014 being about five times 
that of 1974, in inflation-adjusted dollars. 
 
 
 9.  Vital Statistics on Congress, supra note 2, tbls.3-2, 3-3. 
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Fig. 4: Average Senate Campaign Expenditures, 1974–2014 (in 2014 dollars)10 
 
Figure 4 shows the same information for Senate campaigns. There is greater 
variation than the House data because there are fewer races and the possible 
conjunction in one election year of several well-financed candidates running for 
competitive seats in very populous states. The expenditures in those races may 
dramatically skew the average in that year.11 Still, the clear trend of all three 
measures is up, with incumbents in competitive Senate races in 2014 (the solid 
line) spending about four times what they did in 1974, again in inflation-adjusted 
dollars. 
The previous figures show only part of the story because they are limited to 
the reported expenditures of candidates. There are also party and non-party 
independent expenditures that finance campaign activity.12 Figure 5 shows the 
dramatic growth of the latter category since 2008 for House and Senate races. If 
money is contributed disproportionately by persons with strong ideological 
views, then the increased cost of campaigning may help to promote the 
ideological divide. 
 
 
 
 10.  Id. tbls.3-5, 3-6. 
 11.  For example, the spike in the expenditures for all Senate open seats in 2000 included large 
amounts spent in the races in New York (Hillary Clinton), New Jersey (Jon Corzine), and Florida (Bill 
Nelson). 
 12.  According to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), an independent expenditure is one that 
advocates for the election or defeat of a candidate, but not in concert with the candidate or opponent. 
See Independent Expenditure, 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a) (2014).  
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Fig. 5: Total Non-Party Independent Expenditures, 1978–2014 (2014 
dollars)13 
3. “Fracturing” and External Focus of Congress 
In addition to party polarization and the increased cost of campaigning, there 
have been two other important major changes. These developments may initially 
seem to be contradictory but, in fact, may follow naturally from one another. 
One change is a fracturing of Congress into individual members with an 
increasingly external focus. According to one recent observer, the current 
Congress is comprised of “only individual actors, pursuing their own political 
interests and ideological missions willy-nilly, like excited gas molecules in an 
overheated balloon.”14 
This change has been influenced by developments over several decades. In 
the 1970s, there were reforms, principally in the House, to satisfy the post-
Watergate liberal Democrats who rebelled against the controls exerted by the 
mostly conservative, southern Democrats who chaired the committees. The 
reforms enhanced the ability of individual members, including relatively junior 
members, to gain visibility and prominence.15 
Over time, party polarization and the increased cost of campaigning have 
fostered the individualism of members and encouraged them to be more 
 
 13.  Vital Statistics on Congress, supra note 2, tbl.3-14.  
 14.  Jonathan Rauch, How American Politics Went Insane, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2016, at 50, 
52; see SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 25; George K. Yin, Is the Tax System Beyond Reform?, 58 FLA. L. 
REV. 977, 1025–29 (2006). 
 15.  See SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 139–40; cf. JULIAN E. ZELIZER, GOVERNING AMERICA: THE 
REVIVAL OF POLITICAL HISTORY 259–89 (2012) (claiming that these and other congressional reforms 
supported by liberal Democrats in the early 1970s backfired).  
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externally focused. Polarization has made time spent working on legislative 
matters less productive because policy differences are greater and compromises 
much harder to achieve. The need for campaign funds has provided the same 
incentive: the less time devoted to legislative work, the more time available for 
fund-raising and related reelection activities. Partly as a result, during the last 
twenty years or so, Congress has generally not scheduled any votes before 
Tuesday evenings or after Thursday, and fewer members of Congress set up real 
residences in D.C.16 Government service as an elected official has been described 
as being engaged in a “permanent campaign.”17 
Technological changes have facilitated the fracturing. Improvements in 
transportation have allowed every member of Congress to spend each Friday 
through Tuesday in their home state or district if they so wish. Changes in 
communication methods and the explosion of media outlets give legislators many 
opportunities to obtain publicity entirely separate from any accomplishments 
connected to their legislative work. The process of working one’s way up through 
Congress into senior, leadership roles to attain some degree of national 
prominence is clearly a thing of the past.18 An increasing number of members do 
not try to obtain senior positions but use Congress as a steppingstone to lucrative 
lobbying opportunities.19 
Senate rules—described as the “most permissive rules of any legislature in the 
world”20—have long favored the individual rights of Senators. But the increased 
individualism has resulted in less restraint in the exercise of those rights by 
Senators and greater use of practices like “holds” on action or filibusters.21 This 
 
 16.  See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS 
FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 169–70 (2006); SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 
266; SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 110–11.  
 17.  See Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann, Conclusion: The Permanent Campaign and the 
Future of American Democracy, in THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE 219, 220 (Norman J. 
Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann eds., 2000) (“The permanent campaign means that campaigns are nonstop 
and year-round, and governing/campaigning/governing/campaigning takes place in a continuous loop.”); 
Gary C. Jacobson, Partisanship, Money, and Competition: Elections and the Transformation of Congress 
since the 1970s, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 117, 128 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer 
eds., 10th ed. 2013). 
 18.  Cf. SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 59, 101 (describing informal norms of the earlier era). 
 19.  See TIMOTHY M. LAPIRA & HERSCHEL F. THOMAS, REVOLVING DOOR LOBBYING: PUBLIC 
SERVICE, PRIVATE INFLUENCE, AND THE UNEQUAL REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS 8–9 (2017) 
(reporting that between the 1970s and 2006, “the number of lawmakers turned lobbyists increased 433 
percent”); Sam Schwarz, Former Members Follow a Variety of Paths, CQ MAG., June 8, 2015, at 15 
(reporting that out of 64 former members of the 113th Congress (2013–14), by far the highest percentage 
(38%) of those who did not retire had joined a law, lobbying, or consulting firm five months after leaving 
office). 
 20.  Barbara Sinclair, Spoiling the Sausages? How a Polarized Congress Deliberates and Legislates, 
in 2 RED AND BLUE NATION? CONSEQUENCES AND CORRECTION OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED 
POLITICS 55, 70 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2008).  
 21.  A “hold” is a threatened objection to a unanimous consent request to set aside one or more of 
the Senate’s standing rules in order to expedite consideration of legislation on the Senate floor. See 
VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96-548, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON THE SENATE 
FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (2017). 
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is one reason action in the Senate is so often stalled.22 Moreover, the heightened 
polarization and need for campaign funds give Senators the same incentive to cut 
short their legislative activities. 
4. More Centralized Management Structure (or Chaos?) 
Even as Congress has fractured with more and more of its members going 
their separate ways, party leaders have assumed greater control over each 
chamber. These two trends might seem at first blush to be contradictory since 
many cats scurrying around independently is not the picture of an orderly and 
disciplined organization under strong leadership. But the increased individualism 
has enhanced the need for strong leaders if Congress is to function at all. Because 
of the homogeneity of views within each party, members of Congress are more 
willing to delegate authority to a small group of leaders with the same or similar 
views. Meanwhile, the greater ideological separation between the parties has 
heightened the incentive of members in a given party to work together as a 
cohesive team under a strong leader.23 
This trend has been especially evident in the House. The Speaker and top 
deputies exercise control over the Rules Committee and floor debate, influence 
the composition of committees and identity of committee chairs, and help 
determine the substantive content of bills by swaying committee decisions and 
making post-committee adjustments.24 Senate rules limit the ability of the 
Majority Leader to control that chamber to the same extent. But two key rights 
of the Leader are the privilege of first recognition and the scheduling of 
legislation on the Senate floor, and the Leader has employed various 
parliamentary procedures in the Senate that are outside of “regular order” in 
order to carry out the will of the majority party.25 The Leader also influences 
committee assignments and is increasingly involved in developing the content of 
legislation.26 
Interestingly, this strange combination of a highly individualistic, outward-
looking Congress run by strong leaders was envisioned forty years ago: 
  
 
 22.  See SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 55, 59–61, 157 tbl.6.4. 
 23.  See John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: 
The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government, in POLARIZED POLITICS: 
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA 31, 33–34 (Jon R. Bond & Richard Fleisher eds., 
2000); David W. Rohde, Reflections on the Practice of Theorizing: Conditional Party Government in the 
Twenty-First Century, 75 J. POLS. 849, 850 (2013). 
 24.  See SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 21–22, 24–30, 38–39, 149 fig.6.2, 164–65; SMITH ET AL., supra note 
4, at 191–92, 201, 206–08; 1 GUIDE TO CONGRESS 571-72, 648 (CQ Press, 7th ed., 2013); Sinclair, supra 
note 20, at 57–58. 
 25.  See HEITSHUSEN, supra note 21, at 2, 5; SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 47 (describing greater use by 
majority of “hardball procedural ploys”), 57, 83–85; cf. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON 
JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 558–59 (2002) (describing Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson’s use 
of the privilege of recognition to exercise power in the Senate). 
 26.  See SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 53–55; SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 201. 
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 Were members solely preoccupied with reelection, we would expect them to spend 
little time in Washington and devote their personal efforts to constituent speeches and 
district casework. One would expect Congress to be run by a centralized, efficient staff 
who, in league with policy-oriented interest groups, would draft legislation, investigate 
the issues, frame palatable solutions, and present the members with the least 
controversial bills possible. Members of Congress would give little attention to 
committee work, and then only to committees that clearly served reelection interests. 
The primary activity of [members of] Congress, rather, would be extended, televised 
floor debates and symbolic roll call votes, all for show. Such a system would allow the 
appearance of work while providing ample opportunity for the mending of home fences 
. . . . [O]ne might expect a centralized system with a few leaders exercising power and 
all others spending their time on personal or electoral matters.27 
Other than failing to anticipate the changed economics of campaigning and 
the consequent increased involvement of interest groups in all aspects of the 
legislative process, this 1977 description would seem to resemble closely the 
Congress of the last two to three decades. In the most recent past, however, there 
have been indications—the failure of party establishment to curb the rise of the 
Tea Party, Senator Bernie Sanders, and President Donald Trump and the 
inability of congressional leaders to maintain control over their chambers—that 
the forces favoring fracturing may be overwhelming the efforts to maintain order 
through strong, centralized management. If true, the short-term consequence 
might be chaos in Congress.28 Any such condition would presumably be 
temporary since chaos seems like an inherently unsustainable state of affairs, but 
what might follow is anyone’s guess. The 2017 tax bill, approved by a strict party-
line vote, marked a return of strong, centralized party management, however 
ephemeral it may prove to be. 
B. Changes in Congressional Staff 
1. Change in Number of Committee Staff 
Figure 6 shows the changing number of House and Senate committee staff for 
selected years since 1914. Until the late 1940s, the committees had few staff and 
most were clerical and secretarial aides. Legislative reorganization acts in 1946 
and 1970 authorized the appointment of professional aides to assist the 
committees, and the number of committee staff especially grew beginning the 
mid-1970s.29 Following the 1994 election, the Republicans who took control of 
Congress instituted committee staff cuts.30 
 
 
 27.  Lawrence C. Dodd, Congress and the Quest for Power, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 269, 271–
72 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 1977). 
 28.  See Rauch, supra note 14, at 53 (claiming that many reforms have helped produce “chaos 
syndrome . . . a chronic decline in the political system’s capacity for self-organization”). 
 29.  See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 202(a), 60 Stat. 812, 834 (1946); 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, §§ 301(a), 302(b), 84 Stat. 1140, 1175–77 
(1970); George K. Yin, Legislative Gridlock and Nonpartisan Staff, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2287, 2290–
92 (2013). 
 30.  SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 215–16. 
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Fig. 6: Number of House and Senate Committee Staff, Selected Years,  
1914–2015 
2. Change in Composition of House and Senate Staff 
Figure 7 shows the percentage change in different categories of House staff 
over the last forty years, both before (solid bar) and after (patterned bar) the 
Republican takeover in 1994. Whereas the number of staff for the entire House, 
the committees, the Ways and Means Committee (W&M), and the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT), all saw little change or decreases in each period, 
the number of leadership staff sharply increased.31 This result reflects the much 
more prominent role played by leadership in the legislative process. Figure 8 
shows a roughly similar consequence in the Senate during those two periods.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 31.  The percentage change in the number of JCT staff during the first period in both figures 7 and 
8 is from 1978 (not 1977) to 1994. See LARA E. CHAUSOW ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R43947, 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF LEVELS IN MEMBER, COMMITTEE, LEADERSHIP, AND OTHER 
OFFICES, 1977-2016 17 tbl.7 (2016).  
 32.  Until the mid-1970s, the Senate Finance Committee (SFC) had a very small staff, with no 
separate staff for the minority party members, and relied heavily on the JCT staff for assistance. See 
Bernard M. “Bob” Shapiro, The Last 50 Years: The Evolving Role of the Joint Tax Committee, 151 TAX 
NOTES 1125, 1125–26 (2016). Some of the increases for the Finance Committee staff shown in figure 8 
reflect its effort to catch up on the size of its staff. 
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Fig. 7: Percentage Change, Number of House Staff by Category,  
1977–94 and 1994–201633 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33.  CHAUSOW ET AL., supra note 31. 
YIN_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2018  12:55 PM 
254 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 81:241 
 
Fig. 8: Percentage Change, Number of Senate Staff by Category, 1977–94 and 
1994–201634 
 
3. Change in Workplace of Congressional Staff 
Figure 9 shows the proportion of staff allocated by members of Congress to 
their home districts or states, rather than Washington, D.C., over the last forty 
years. There has been a steady shift of member staff away from D.C., rising in the 
House from about one-third to almost one-half outside D.C., and in the Senate, 
from about one-quarter to over 40%. These trends are consistent with the 
increasingly individualistic, outward-looking focus of members of Congress. 
They see their responsibilities and future opportunities more and more in 
performing constituent services and building electoral connections at home 
rather than performing legislative and oversight functions in D.C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34.  Id. 
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Fig. 9: Percentage of Member Staff Working in Home District/State,  
1978–201635 
 
III 
EFFECT OF CHANGES ON TYPE OF TAX LEGISLATION PRODUCED 
A. Changing Role of Committees and Decline in Deliberation 
The changes described in Part II have especially affected the role of the 
committees and committee chairs. Under an “informational” model of 
committee function,36 committees provide members of Congress with an 
opportunity to specialize and develop expertise for the benefit of the entire 
chamber. Respect for a committee’s recommendations depends upon how closely 
they align with the general preferences of the chamber majority. When partisan 
differences are not too stark, committee members have an interest in setting aside 
some of their differences to locate the “sweet spot” that will win chamber 
approval. As Representative Mills, long-time chair of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, explained it: “I think if I can get a vast majority of the 
membership of the Ways and Means Committee to agree on something, that I’ve 
 
 35.  Vital Statistics on Congress, supra note 2, tbls.5-3, 5-4.  
 36.  SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 178. 
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got a vast majority of the House to agree on the same thing.”37 Committees that 
repeatedly accomplish this feat become influential. Overall, the informational 
model gives the chair and committee members an incentive to take their 
committee responsibilities seriously and reach compromises.38 
In contrast, under a “partisan” model of the committee system,39 the 
committees are essentially branches of the congressional parties and exist largely 
to serve their interests. The party leadership determines the committee’s chair, 
membership, and agenda, all with an eye on furthering the party’s policy 
preferences. If partisan differences are very stark, then compromise may be 
neither feasible nor necessary since cohesion within the majority party controls 
outcomes—both in committee and the congressional chamber.40 Under this 
model, for committee members, “substantive expertise and hard work on one’s 
committee [produce] relatively little payoff in influence.”41 
At any given time, committees perform both informational and partisan roles. 
But the changes over roughly the last twenty-five years have caused some shift 
from the former function to the latter. Combined with the abbreviated legislative 
schedule in D.C.—making it harder for committees to perform serious work even 
if they were so inclined—and term limits and other procedural restraints placed 
on the chairs (restricting their effectiveness), the overall result has been to reduce 
the influence of the committees and committee chairs.42 In the extreme case, the 
committees are bypassed altogether and legislation is developed by the 
chamber’s leadership and the leader’s top aides.43 
These changes have perhaps been no more evident than in the House Ways 
and Means Committee. Because of the Origination Clause and the reputation of 
the House as the “workhorse” of Congress, the Ways and Means Committee has 
traditionally been the venue to develop virtually all serious tax legislation. Over 
the years, the committee maintained its influence by reporting balanced bills 
 
 37.  See JULIAN E. ZELIZER, TAXING AMERICA: WILBUR D. MILLS, CONGRESS, AND THE STATE, 
1945-1975, at 123 (1998).  
 38.  See SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 16–17; SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 178–79; ZELIZER, supra 
note 37, at 145 (quoting view that members who earned prestige among their peers performed their 
legislative “homework”). 
 39.  SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 180.  
 40.  See id. 
 41.  SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 265. 
 42.  See id. at 266; SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 191–92, 209–12; Craig Volden & Alan Wiseman, 
How Term Limits for Committee Chairs Make Congress Less Effective, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/04/how-term-limits-for-committee-
chairs-make-congress-less-effective/ [https://perma.cc/AL3D-G6EW] (“[C]ommittee chairs are being 
replaced just as they hit their stride.”). 
 43.  See SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 18–21, 51–53, 151 fig.6.3; Sean Sullivan & Robert Costa, 
Republicans Are in Full Control of Government—But Losing Control of Their Party, WASH. POST (July 
23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/republicans-are-in-full-control-of-government—
but-losing-control-of-their-party/2017/07/23/b1ab6bbc-6d92-11e7-9c15-177740635e83_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/J2U8-5QH6] (reporting that Senate’s 2017 health reform bill was written by Majority 
Leader and his aides). 
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designed to appeal to a broad cross-section of the House. Only more senior 
members holding safe congressional seats were generally assigned to the 
committee to enable them to follow a norm of restrained partisanship in their 
committee work.44 
Today’s committee is much different. Increasingly, newer members from 
competitive districts are assigned to the committee to give them an electoral and 
fund-raising boost. Meanwhile, the power of the committee has largely been 
transferred to party leaders.45 Speaker Boehner’s famed disparagement of a 2014 
tax reform bill developed by Ways and Means Committee Chairman Camp and 
resolution of the 2012 fiscal cliff crisis without the participation of the tax 
committees and their chairs are just two recent illustrations.46 Although one 
hesitates to draw too strong a conclusion from the truly bizarre 2017 session of 
Congress, the process it followed in trying to repeal and replace the ACA seems 
to have been an extreme version of the change just described. For important 
legislation affecting millions of Americans, committee involvement in both the 
House and Senate was essentially nonexistent.47 
Congress followed largely the same process in passing the 2017 tax bill. Each 
tax committee considered the massive legislation, potentially affecting every 
person and business in the country, in less than two weeks and marked up its bill 
 
 44.  See JOHN F. MANLEY, THE POLITICS OF FINANCE: THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND 
MEANS 45–53, 63–87 (1970); ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 42; Hon. Thomas B. Curtis, The House 
Committee on Ways and Means: Congress Seen Through a Key Committee, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 121, 125, 
141 (1966). Figure 1 shows that there clearly were partisan differences on Ways and Means during earlier 
periods, but legislative conditions apparently gave the committee members sufficient incentive to 
overcome their differences. 
 45.  See John H. Aldrich et al., Richard Fenno’s Theory of Congressional Committees and the 
Partisan Polarization of the House, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 17, at 193, 209; Yin, supra 
note 14, at 1027, 1040–41 (appendix).  
 46.  See SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 192–93 (describing Camp’s absence from fiscal cliff resolution 
as a “shocking turn of events”); Ed O’Keefe, Boehner on Tax Reform: “Blah, Blah, Blah, Blah,” WASH. 
POST (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/02/26/boehner-on-
tax-reform-blah-blah-blah-blah/ [https://perma.cc/67AT-S4YH]. For a summary of the fiscal cliff events, 
see Wesley Elmore & Lindsey McPherson, U.S. Goes Over Fiscal Cliff, but Just for a Day, 138 TAX 
NOTES 12 (2013). 
 47.  See Robert Pear, Law Took Months to Draft; Repeal May Be Much Swifter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 
2017, at A14 (describing secretive and “lightning fast” first consideration by House committees and 
House); Erin Mershon & Lindsey McPherson, How the House Finally Got to “Yes” on Health Care, CQ 
ROLL CALL (May 5, 2017), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/house-finally-got-yes-health-care 
[https://perma.cc/3YMU-TJEP] (describing chaotic second House effort); Jennifer Steinhauer et al., How 
a Health Care Bill Failed: G.O.P. Divisions and a Fed-Up President, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2017, at A14 
(describing process failures in first Senate effort); Thomas Kaplan, Five Takeaways from the Failed Senate 
Effort to Repeal Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
07/28/us/politics/senate-health-care-highlights-mccain-murkowski.html [https://perma.cc/2W2B-FCY5] 
(describing failures in second Senate effort); Paul Kane, The ACA Repeal Effort Was Bad News from the 
Start, with Little Public Scrutiny and Little Chance for Success, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/the-aca-repeal-effort-was-bad-news-from-the-start-with-
little-public-scrutiny-and-little-chance-for-success/2017/09/25/635a060e-a1e4-11e7-b14f-
f41773cd5a14_story.html?utm_term=.15a02e659d8b [https://perma.cc/57QD-BKRC] (describing final 
Senate failure).  
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in just four days. Neither committee convened a single hearing subsequent to 
introduction of the proposed legislation.48 In contrast, Congress took about two 
years to consider and approve the last major rewrite of the tax laws—the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986—with the House Ways and Means Committee holding thirty 
days of full committee hearings, ten days of subcommittee hearings, and twenty-
six days of markup, and the Senate Finance Committee holding thirty-six days of 
full committee hearings, six days of subcommittee hearings, and seventeen days 
of markup.49 Senate floor action on the 2017 bill was so rushed and non-
transparent that the Senate approved its almost 500-page bill just hours after 
receiving it, when it still contained indecipherable, hand-scribbled changes.50 The 
secrecy and speedy passage of the far-reaching legislation contributed to its 
complexity and seems destined to produce many dubious outcomes, both 
intended and unintended.51 
The demise of the committees has meant a loss of deliberation and legislative 
expertise.52 The “hard work” of legislating that has mostly been performed by the 
committees—identifying and investigating problems, devising and analyzing 
possible solutions, obtaining and evaluating input from the public and outside 
experts, debating solutions and reaching compromises during markups, floor 
debate, and conferences, and drafting careful legislative language to reflect the 
intended solution—has simply become more and more rare in today’s Congress.53 
The unwillingness to undertake the “admittedly arduous . . . robust deliberative 
process” is symptomatic of a contemporary attitude in Congress that 
“deliberation, fairness, bipartisanship, and debate are impediments to the larger 
goal of achieving political and policy success.”54 
 
 48.  See Jonathan Curry, Tax Bill Takes a Topsy-Turvy Road to GOP Victory, 157 TAX NOTES 1667, 
1668 (2017); Erica Werner, Precision Sacrificed for Speed as GOP Rushes Ahead on Taxes, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/precision-sacrificed-for-speed-as-
gop-rushes-ahead-on-taxes/2017/12/10/876ab274-dc62-11e7-b1a8-
62589434a581_story.html?utm_term=.898e19eea17f [https://perma.cc/3ASQ-97FB].  
 49.  See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-10-87, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1–5 (Comm. Print 1987).  
 50.  See John Cassidy, The Passage of the Senate Republican Tax Bill Was a Travesty, NEW YORKER 
(Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/sections/news/the-passage-of-the-senate-republican-tax-bill-
was-a-travesty [https://perma.cc/NY7J-8LAA]; Jim Tankersley & Alan Rappeport, A Hasty, Hand-
Scribbled Tax Bill Sets Off an Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
12/01/us/politics/hand-scribbled-tax-bill-outcry.html [https://perma.cc/S2DV-XF5X]. 
 51.  See Brian Faler, “Holy Crap”: Experts Find Tax Plan Riddled with Glitches, POLITICO (Dec. 6, 
2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/06/tax-plan-glitches-mistakes-republicans-208049 [https:// 
perma.cc/EK8T-FA5B]; Jim Tankersley, A Curveball from the New Tax Law: It Makes Baseball Trades 
Harder, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/us/politics/baseball-tax-law-
.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share [https://perma.cc/U3W2-VACT] (describing 
surprising effect of new tax law on trading of professional athletes). 
 52.  See LAPIRA & THOMAS, supra note 19, at 12–17 (summarizing recent literature on reduced 
legislative expertise); MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 216; SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 265–66.  
 53.  Cf. Curtis, supra note 44, at 128–43 (describing extended deliberative process undertaken by 
Ways and Means Committee in 1964). 
 54.  MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 170–71. 
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How have these changes affected the substance of tax legislation? Michael 
Doran has argued that some of the changes previously noted—heightened 
polarization in Congress and its more centralized management structure—as well 
as relaxed budgetary constraints on tax legislation in recent years, have all 
facilitated legislation that is less “particularistic” than legislation in the past.55 In 
general, he defined a particularistic provision as one that is narrow in scope 
affecting few taxpayers.56 He very roughly illustrated the reduced particularism 
by comparing the shorter average length of tax statutes enacted between 2001 
and 2013 with those passed between 1981 and 1998.57 
His reasoning is straightforward. The changes in party ideology—increased 
divisions between the parties but cohesion within them—and congressional 
organizational structure have reduced tax committee influence and involvement 
in producing legislation. This effect is important because the tax committees have 
historically been the “pre-eminent vehicle for pork-barrel legislation,” that is, 
highly particularistic changes that benefit certain constituents and interest groups 
and not others.58 More generally, the greater party control over legislative 
outcomes has made it less necessary to engage in logrolling—the trading of votes 
to secure a majority in favor of the bill—and “less logrolling implies less 
legislative particularism.”59 Finally, relaxed budgetary constraints, such as non-
enforcement of PAYGO rules that require revenue losses to be offset by revenue 
increases, have further facilitated less particularism. Proposed tax increases, 
including those that merely offset revenue losses in an overall revenue neutral 
bill, encounter interest group opposition that causes legislators to step gingerly 
and develop more particularistic proposals. Proposed tax cuts do not face the 
same problem and therefore do not have the same effect.60 
Prior analysts have tried to explain tax legislation principally by focusing on 
legislator motivations, but Doran smartly shows that exogenous events and 
institutional structures are additional factors to consider.61 His claim may also 
complement my assertion regarding structural legislation. Since such legislation 
may well be particularistic, its absence may contribute to the phenomenon Doran 
identifies. 
 
 
 55.  See Michael Doran, Tax Legislation in the Contemporary U.S. Congress, 67 TAX L. REV. 555, 
561, 586–96 (2014). 
 56.  See id. at 568. 
 57.  See id. at 568–69. 
 58.  See id. at 593; SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 179; ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 123 (describing 
Mills partaking in interest group politics). 
 59.  Doran, supra note 55, at 591.  
 60.  See id. at 595–96, 600. 
 61.  See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1987); Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, 
On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987); Doran, 
supra note 55, at 580, 586–88; Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the 
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1990).  
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Still, his explanation for the lack of particularism in recent years seems 
incomplete. He asserts, for example, that because of institutional changes in the 
House, “a powerful speaker can turn aside the distributive tendencies of the tax-
writing committees and . . . bring a clean bill to the floor under a rule that 
precludes or sharply limits amendments.”62 What he does not explain is why party 
leaders may have made that choice in the recent past (or might do so in the 
future). Given the heightened ideological polarization between the parties in 
Congress and the escalating cost of campaigns, is there any reason to believe 
legislators have less reason than previously to make particularistic changes that 
reward friends or punish enemies, whether inside or outside the legislature? 
One possible account is that a clean tax amendment, such as a change in tax 
rates, sends an especially salient policy message to supporters. The problem with 
this explanation is that tax bills are not limited to a handful of provisions. Party 
leaders can produce legislation that changes tax rates, or makes other non-
particularistic changes with strong policy signals, and also includes particularistic 
provisions that pick winners and losers. Another possibility is that the decline in 
deliberation has left Congress unable to produce particularistic tax legislation, 
but this claim is implausible. Without deliberation, it may be harder to identify 
and develop good policy. But it’s not especially challenging to produce bills 
establishing tax benefits and burdens, and there is always plenty of private-sector 
help available to lend a hand if the work gets too hard. 
Yet another account is that a clean bill may have started out messy, with the 
removal of particularistic harmful tax provisions having produced the desired 
return from interest groups and other legislators.63 The validity of this proposition 
could be researched, although it would be tricky to determine exactly which prior 
harmful tax ideas should be considered. Moreover, at some point, the effect of 
crying wolf might be expected to exhaust itself. This account also does not explain 
the absence of provisions favoring particular taxpayers. 
Finally, it is conceivable that the policy preference of the majority in recent 
years was for clean tax legislation, with that preference being strong enough to 
swamp other competing objectives—including interest in using legislation to 
maximize campaign contributions. Perhaps this outcome resulted from a 
confluence of conservative and liberal principles antagonistic to the picking of 
winners and losers, at least at the level of discrete taxpayers or industries. This 
proposition would be interesting to examine and establish, a development 
essentially contrary to the general manner tax legislation has been produced in 
this country. 
In summary, Doran has usefully identified some legislative conditions—high 
interparty division but intraparty cohesion, centralized congressional 
management and reduced committee influence, and little or no budget 
 
 62.  Doran, supra note 55, at 599. 
 63.  See id. at 572–73. 
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constraints—that may permit the enactment of non-particularistic legislation. 
But none of these factors would lead party leaders to choose that form of 
legislation, and other developments give reason to think leaders would be 
reluctant to do so. If tax legislation has become less particularistic in the recent 
past, the reason remains a mystery. Even with all of the factors present, the 2017 
tax bill is marked by considerable particularity. 
Doran shows the challenge of explaining tax legislative outcomes, let alone 
making predictions for the future. Focusing on just structural tax legislation both 
simplifies and complicates the task. Because such legislation generally has 
modest policy objectives and probably low political salience, its production would 
likely not be much affected by concerns about campaign contributions, budgetary 
impact, or the picking of winners and losers.64 On the other hand, the technical 
nature of such legislation requires delving a little deeper into the legislative 
process to consider the impact of the professional tax staff who would almost 
certainly craft the legislation. The next subpart reviews changes in such staff over 
the years. 
B. Changes in Professional Staff Working on Tax Legislation65 
The following discussion describes the professional staff involved in the 
formation of tax legislation during four periods since passage of the first Act of 
the modern income tax in 1913. The dates specified for each period are very 
approximate. Although specific events help to mark some of the transitions, the 
practical implementation of change varied, and evidence of change is limited. 
Moreover, some of the shifts occurred because of factors that are not clearly date-
specific, such as the increased partisanship in Congress illustrated in Figures 1 
and 2. Finally, the effect of any change is necessarily a function of the particular 
persons involved—the legislators and their staff—and variation from the general 
trend may result merely from that factor. Still, although the dates of change are 
approximate, the trends described below should present an accurate overall 
picture. 
1. Period I: 1913–1926: Treasury Staff Only 
During this period, Treasury dominated the tax legislative process. As a result 
of its sole custody of tax returns, responsibility for tax administration, and 
detailed knowledge of the nation’s fiscal situation, the Department was especially 
well situated to identify the need for possible tax legislative changes. Moreover, 
Treasury had professional staff, including economists, to prepare analysis from 
the data and other information that could serve as the basis for specific 
 
 64.  One exception was the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in 1986, a long-sought structural 
change that ultimately was approved in part because the doctrine became associated with merger activity 
in the oil and gas industry. See Lee Sheppard, General Utilities Repeal and “Dynasty,” 30 TAX NOTES 85 
(1986). 
 65.  Portions of this section have been drawn from George K. Yin, Codification of the Tax Law and 
the Emergence of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 71 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
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proposals.66 Members of Congress had few resources of their own and were 
generally forced to make somewhat uninformed choices between the Treasury’s 
position on proposed legislation and those of the private sector. One Senator 
rued Congress’s role as “mere rubber stamps” to Treasury during this period.67 
2. Period II: 1927–1975: Treasury and JCT Staffs Only 
Congress established the JCT and its staff in 1926,68 and from 1927 until 
sometime in the mid-1970s, the Treasury and JCT staffs were essentially the only 
unelected professionals directly involved in the formation of tax legislation. 
During this period, Congress also received help from professionals working for a 
legislative reference unit in the Library of Congress (created in 1914 and now the 
Congressional Research Service), the House and Senate Offices of Legislative 
Counsel (formed in 1924 from legislative drafting services approved in 1918), and 
the General Accounting Office (created in 1921 and now the Government 
Accountability Office). But none of those staffs worked directly for the 
committees or helped with day-to-day work on the formation of legislation.69 
As shown in Figure 6, the committees had few staff of their own before 1946 
and most were clerical and secretarial aides. Aside from the JCT staff, about the 
only professional committee staff until 1946 belonged to the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees.70 
In part due to satisfaction with the JCT staff, Congress in 1946 authorized a 
small number of nonpartisan professionals for each committee.71 The 
committees, however, were only partly successful in hiring qualified personnel. 
According to one noted congressional scholar, roughly half of the new committee 
staffers—supposedly picked on a nonpartisan basis—were selected with political 
considerations in mind.72 Moreover, by that point, the JCT staff had a twenty-
year head start in working on tax legislative matters and developing close 
relationships with key legislators. Thus, it was not until sometime after the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, which authorized a greater number of 
professionals for the committees with separate allocations for the majority and 
 
 66.  See ROY BLOUGH, THE FEDERAL TAXING PROCESS 97–99, 104–06 (1952). 
 67.  Revenue Act of 1926: Hearings on H.R. 1 Before S. Comm. on Finance, 69th Cong. 215–16 (1926) 
(statement of Sen. Andrieus Jones). 
 68.  See Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 1203, 44 Stat. 9, 127–28 (1926). Until 1976, the 
name of the committee was the “Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation.” See Tax Reform Act 
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1907(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1835 (1976). 
 69.  See Yin, supra note 29, at 2290–97. The Congressional Budget Office was not created until 1974 
and its staff also does not work directly on legislation like the JCT or committee staff. See id. at 2300–01. 
 70.  See CHARLES L. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN: HIS WORK AS HE SEES IT 255 (1963). 
 71.  See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 202(a), 60 Stat. 812, 834 (1946); 
92 CONG. REC. H6518 (June 8, 1946) (statement of Sen. La Follette, Jr.); Michael J. Malbin, Delegation, 
Deliberation, and the New Role of Congressional Staff, in THE NEW CONGRESS 134, 138 (Thomas E. 
Mann & Norman J. Ornstein eds., 1981). 
 72.  See George B. Galloway, The Operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 45 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 41, 55 (1951); JOSEPH COOPER, CONGRESS AND ITS COMMITTEES 264–65 (1988); 
WILLIAM L. MORROW, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 53–56 (1969). 
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minority parties, that the monopoly of the JCT and Treasury staffs in the tax 
legislative area truly began to be broken.73 
Three other important events occurring between 1974 and 1980 contributed 
to the end of the monopoly: Representative Mills lost his chair of the Ways and 
Means Committee in 1974 (after seventeen years in that position), Larry 
Woodworth resigned as JCT chief of staff in 1977 (after fourteen years in that 
position and thirty-four years total on that staff), and Senator Long lost his chair 
of the Finance Committee in 1980 (after sixteen years in that position). Since 
Woodworth’s departure, due to frequent turnover among the tax committee 
chairs or the JCT chief of staff, there has never been a period even close to the 
length of time Woodworth and his predecessor at the JCT (Colin Stam, who was 
chief of staff for twenty-six years and a staff member for thirty-seven years) were 
able to work with the same committee chairs and develop a close, trusting 
relationship with them.74 
The comparative influence of the JCT and Treasury staffs fluctuated during 
this period, with Treasury generally being more dominant throughout the 1930s 
and the JCT staff playing an increasingly influential role thereafter. But for 
purposes of this article, the main takeaway is that for almost fifty years in the 
middle of the twentieth century, the tax legislative process was principally served 
by just two staffs—Treasury’s and the JCT’s—known for their nonpartisan 
expertise.75 
3. Period III: 1976–1990: Treasury, JCT, and Mostly Nonpartisan Other 
Staffs 
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 formally gave birth to the 
bipartisan staff structure that remains today on most committees—but not the 
JCT—where the majority and minority members have separate staff. As shown 
in Figure 6, the mid-1970s marked the beginning of a sharp increase in the 
number of committee staff that continued until the first half of the 1990s. As a 
result, during period III, the JCT and Treasury staffs were joined by professional 
tax committee aides working for either the majority or minority parties. But the 
committee staff during this period, especially from the Senate, generally acted 
 
 73.  See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, §§ 301(a), 302(b), 84 Stat. 1140, 
1175–77 (1970); MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND 
THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 181 (1979); Walter Kravitz, The Advent of the 
Modern Congress: The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 375, 379 (1990); Yin, 
supra note 29, at 2292. 
 74.  See E. W. Kenworthy, Colin F. Stam: A Study in Anonymous Power, in ADVENTURES IN PUBLIC 
SERVICE 105, 116 (Delia Kuhn & Ferdinand Kuhn eds., 1963) (describing Stam’s ability “to keep the 
committees out of trouble, and individual members from making fools of themselves”); MALBIN, supra 
note 73, at 170–77, 186 (describing Woodworth’s influence); ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 49 (“More than 
any other individual, Mills would come to rely on Woodworth as a confidant and advisor.”). 
 75.  See Curtis, supra note 44, at 126–28 (describing role of JCT staff in early 1960s in formation of 
tax legislation); Ronald A. Pearlman, The Tax Legislative Process: 1972-1992, 57 TAX NOTES 939, 941–
42 (1992); Shapiro, supra note 32, at 1127. 
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with restrained partisanship, consistent with the views of the tax committee 
members at the time.76 
4. Period IV: 1991–Present: Treasury, JCT, and Mostly Partisan Other Staffs 
During period IV, the Treasury, JCT, and committee staffs have been joined 
by additional professionals working directly on tax legislative matters. Beginning 
in the mid-1980s, it became increasingly common for individual members of the 
committees to hire tax specialists on their personal staffs to help with the 
member’s tax committee responsibilities. In addition, beginning sometime in the 
early 1990s, the leadership of each house of Congress began playing a more active 
role in the formation of all legislation including tax legislation. Thus, since around 
the early 1990s until the present, there have been four main groups of legislative 
staff participating in the formation of tax legislation: leadership staff, partisan 
committee staff (majority and minority), personal staff of members, and the JCT 
staff.77 
The first three staffs have become increasingly partisan, consistent with the 
heightened partisanship in Congress and the tax committees during this period. 
Leadership and personal staff tend to reflect closely the political and policy 
preferences of their bosses. With some exceptions, committee staff have also 
become more partisan. As stated by one recent observer, “it is a mistake to think 
that committee staff are apolitical bureaucrats . . . . Committee staff work for the 
committee chair or ranking member, and it is rarely the case that they are not 
extremely closely aligned with their boss’s personal preferences and political 
agenda . . . .”78 
The JCT staff’s role in the tax legislative process has changed during this 
period and not simply because of the greater number of participants. Effective 
beginning in 1974, the staff was formally designated as the official scorekeeper in 
Congress on tax matters, a responsibility that continues to this day.79 Revenue 
estimating, described as largely an “afterthought” in 1972, has since become 
much more sophisticated and important.80 At the same time, however, the staff’s 
influence in developing tax legislation has been overshadowed somewhat by the 
 
 76.  See Figure 2; CLAPP, supra note 70, at 261; MANLEY, supra note 44, at 63–87; Curtis, supra note 
44, at 141. 
 77.  See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 1128–29. 
 78.  Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 88 (2015); see 
Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 807, 845-46 (2014); Christine DeGregorio, Staff Utilization in the U.S. Congress: 
Committee Chairs and Senior Aides, 28 POLITY 261, 272 (1995) (reporting (albeit for an earlier era) 
greatest delegation of responsibility to committee staff whose principal goal was loyalty to the committee 
chair). Once again, committee staff of the Senate are generally less partisan than the House’s. 
 79.  The designation was enacted in 1985 but subsequently included as section 201(f) of the 1974 
Congressional Budget Act. See Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 273, 99 Stat. 1037, 1098 (1985); Pub. L. No. 101-508, 
§ 13202(b), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-615 (1990); Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 10102(c), 111 Stat. 251, 678 (1997). 
 80.  See Pearlman, supra note 75, at 940–41. 
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other professionals involved in the process.81 
There are a number of reasons for the change. As nonpartisan staff of a joint 
committee, the JCT staff serves two or four principal masters—the chairs and 
ranking members of the tax committees—and 535 members in all, whereas all of 
the other professionals essentially serve just one legislator and can closely align 
their professional responsibilities to that person. The other professionals also 
have much closer physical proximity to their boss than the JCT staff and are 
therefore more accessible.82 It is thus not hard to understand why members of 
Congress may prefer to rely more on their “own” personal or committee staff 
rather than a nonpartisan staff that belongs to no one. The JCT staff’s position as 
scorekeeper tends to underscore the different staff roles. A scorekeeper is 
analogous to a referee in a sporting contest, and as Congress has increasingly 
separated itself into opposing “teams,” members of Congress reasonably 
perceive the JCT staff, unlike their own staff, as standing apart from their “side.” 
Thus, as its revenue-estimating role has grown in visibility and importance, the 
JCT staff is increasingly viewed like staff of a legislative support organization 
(such as CBO, CRS, and GAO) rather than committee staff helping directly in 
the formation of legislation. 
Finally, during this period, a similar phenomenon has occurred in the 
executive branch. It too has developed a more centralized organizational 
structure with important initiatives originating from, and controlled by, the White 
House and OMB rather than the agencies. This change has tended to introduce 
more partisan players from the executive branch into the legislative process. In 
short, a greater number of partisan voices have tended to dominate the formation 
of tax legislation during period IV.83 
C. Impact on Structural Legislation 
To determine the impact of these changes in the legislative process on the 
production of tax legislation, this section subdivides legislation into a few broad 
categories. Because tax bills typically include a range of different types of 
provisions, drawing conclusions based on the entirety of a bill may obscure 
important distinctions.84 
Two types of complex tax changes are structural elements of a major tax 
reform and structural changes unconnected to major reform. A difference 
between the two is their policy impact. In general, unlike major tax reform, a 
 
 81.  See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 1130. A recent text about Congress does not even mention any 
role of the JCT staff other than revenue estimating. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 177. 
 82.  The JCT staff’s locational disadvantage was exacerbated in recent years when it lost its long-
time suite of offices on the first floor of the Longworth Building and was relocated to offices about six 
blocks from the Capitol. 
 83.  See Pearlman, supra note 75, at 943 (describing less significant role of Treasury since 1986 and 
greater involvement of White House and OMB); Shapiro, supra note 32, at 1129. 
 84.  Cf. Doran, supra note 55, at 581 (criticizing accounts that “collapse the entire legislative package, 
with all its complexity, into [a single theme]”).  
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structural change that is not part of a major reform has modest policy significance 
since it is merely trying to maintain the sound functioning of existing law. 
Non-complex tax changes may also have high or low policy significance. The 
first type might be a change in tax rates, although some rate changes have 
complicated collateral effects.85 A non-complex change with low policy 
significance would be a straightforward technical correction, such as revision of 
an incorrect term or grammatical error in the statute. A technical correction that 
has a collateral effect on many parts of the tax law might be analogous to a 
structural change—complex legislation with low policy significance. 
Table 1 summarizes the expected cost and benefit to tax staff and legislators 
who produce these categories of tax provisions. The analysis assumes that 
complex changes cost more, in terms of time and effort, than non-complex ones. 
It also assumes that, at least for strongly partisan legislators and staff, tax changes 
having higher policy significance provide a greater benefit than those that do not. 
 
Table 1: Expected Cost and Benefit of Selected Tax Legislative Changes 
Type of tax legislative change benefit cost 
Structural change unconnected to major reform Low High 
Structural change implementing a major tax reform High High 
Non-complex change with high policy impact (tax rate change) High Low 
Non-complex change with low policy impact (straightforward 
technical correction) Low Low 
 
Table 1 suggests that a non-complex change with a high policy impact, such 
as a tax rate change, would be an especially favored form of tax provision. This 
conclusion might seem to support Doran’s thesis since a tax rate change is his 
quintessential example of a non-particularistic provision.86 His claim, however, 
relates to the non-particularistic nature of an entire bill. As previously discussed, 
he must therefore explain the exclusion of other changes in tax bills in the recent 
past, including provisions picking individual winners and losers. They may 
provide a high benefit, in terms of policy significance or political or monetary 
return, be particularistic, and yet involve a fairly low cost of production, 
especially if private-sector help is supplied. 
Table 1 also suggests that a structural change unconnected to major reform 
would be a disfavored form of tax provision. To a partisan staffer or legislator 
looking to achieve a significant policy change, this high-cost, low-return form of 
legislation would seem to have little appeal. 
Importantly, the cost-benefit analysis of such legislation may differ for a 
nonpartisan staffer such as one working for the JCT. To understand why, it is 
 
 85.  The tax law may now be so entangled as to make virtually any change a complex one. If so, the 
only meaningful difference may be the high or low policy significance of a change. 
 86.  See Doran, supra note 55, at 568. 
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necessary to consider some differences between JCT and partisan staff positions 
and the type of professionals who are commonly attracted to each. 
In general, the JCT’s staff is larger than any of the job settings of partisan 
staff. Partisan staffers who assist leadership or a single member of Congress 
generally perform their tax responsibilities on their own. In addition, partisan 
committee staffers work on smaller staffs than the JCT’s in part because the 
division of committee staff between majority and minority parties produces some 
duplication of staff effort. The different size of the staff settings enables JCT staff 
to specialize more than partisan staff and perform more in-depth work in fewer 
areas of responsibility. 
Partisan staff positions are generally more political than the JCT’s. Partisan 
staffers work more closely with members of Congress and may perform some 
“political” tasks, such as obtaining intelligence from other offices about 
legislation, helping to assemble interest group and legislator coalitions in favor 
or against a particular initiative, strategizing on legislative tactics, and generally 
assisting their boss in determining the politics of a particular issue. In contrast, 
JCT staff spend more time developing and evaluating legislative proposals. The 
staff’s lawyers, economists, and accountants typically work closely together to 
identify and analyze options and try to anticipate all of their legal and economic 
consequences. The staffers continue the analytical process as they help draft the 
proposed legislation, document its meaning and intended purpose, and estimate 
its revenue consequences. The difference in staff size and duties generally means 
that partisan staffers spend less time than JCT staff analyzing the details of 
legislative proposals.87 
Staff involvement in policy debates is also different. If they wish, partisan 
staffers can simply echo the policy views of their particular boss. Nonpartisan 
staffers generally do not have this option. Because they serve legislators on all 
sides of an issue, to maintain their credibility and potential influence, they must 
carefully balance any positions that they articulate. As described by one member 
of Congress, the position of the JCT chief of staff is like being “a juggler on a 
tightrope.”88 The starker the policy differences presented by an issue, the harder 
the balancing act. It is for this reason that nonpartisan staffers are sometimes 
viewed as fading into the background when a policy debate becomes especially 
heated.89 By contrast, partisan staffers may thrive in that environment by 
 
 87.  Cf. Shobe, supra note 78, at 846 (“The political nature of committee and individual-member 
staff positions make it difficult for these staff to focus on the technical language of statutes.”). 
 88.  Curtis, supra note 44, at 127; see Stanley S. Surrey, The Federal Tax Legislative Process, 31 REC. 
ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 515, 519 (1976) (describing role as “almost impossible”); THOMAS J. REESE, THE 
POLITICS OF TAXATION 63 (1980); John F. Manley, Congressional Staff and Public Policy-Making: The 
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 30 J. POLS. 1046, 1052 (1968) (describing nonpartisan staff 
norms of objectivity, bipartisanship, and neutrality).  
 89.  See BERTRAM M. GROSS, THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE: A STUDY IN SOCIAL COMBAT 282 
(1953); Surrey, supra note 88, at 520 (claiming that staff’s “need to maintain a posture of neutrality is 
basically inconsistent with a real leadership role”); Yin, supra note 29, at 2316–20 (describing 
incompatibility of neutrality with full utilization of nonpartisan staff’s expertise); cf. David E. Price, 
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becoming more visible to legislators and interest groups with specific policy 
agendas. 
These different features of the staff jobs are generally well known and tend 
to make partisan positions more attractive to professionals who envision 
involvement in a legislative practice following their time on the Hill. That type of 
practice typically values professionals who have connections with key legislators 
and interest groups and savvy knowledge of the legislative process.90 It may not, 
however, place much premium on a staffer’s detailed familiarity with complex 
statutory provisions, especially ones with modest policy significance.91 In 
contrast, JCT staff positions tend to be more attractive to professionals who plan 
to work in a tax practice when they leave the Hill. Those jobs commonly reward 
persons with perceptive understanding of intricate parts of the law, including 
structural tax provisions, and especially value the analytical work typically 
performed by a JCT staffer. A JCT staffer may, thus, relish the opportunity to 
work on a structural revision of the law and view its generally low policy 
significance as an appealing feature and not something to disdain. A partisan 
staffer may perceive the same task as largely taking time away from more 
productive pursuits. 
Could partisan and nonpartisan staffers divide legislative responsibilities with 
each working on the type of project especially appealing to them? A possible 
problem is agenda control. Although legislators typically do not get very involved 
in the background details and actual preparation of legislation, they often set the 
agenda of what projects should be undertaken. They may not place a very high 
priority on a complex project with unfamiliar and modest policy significance, 
especially if the partisan staffers on whom they most rely share the same attitude. 
The effect is exacerbated if agenda is set by leadership and leadership staff, who 
generally are more political and less familiar with the substantive consequences 
of the tax law than committee members and staff. Indeed, if heightened 
polarization has led legislators and partisan staffers to “increasingly view issues 
through the prism of politics,”92 they may be skeptical or even suspicious of 
projects involving unfamiliar substance. For the same reason, legislators may be 
unwilling to delegate the task of structural revision to the Treasury. 
Overall, the increased involvement and influence of partisan staffers in the 
formation of legislation during period IV provide reason to believe that structural 
 
Professionals and “Entrepreneurs”: Staff Orientations and Policy Making on Three Senate Committees, 
33 J. POLS. 316, 335 (1971) (summarizing differences between staff professionals and policy 
entrepreneurs). 
 90.  See LAPIRA & THOMAS, supra note 19, at 6–7 (claiming that prior government experience is 
key attribute for a successful lobbyist and that insider knowledge of legislative procedures is more 
important than connections); Jordi Blanes i Vidal et al., Revolving Door Lobbyists, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 
3731, 3731–32 (2012) (claiming that connections are more important). Both authorities document the 
growing percentage of congressional and government staffers who become “revolving door lobbyists.” 
See LAPIRA & THOMAS, supra note 19, at 10–11, 36–40; Blanes i Vidal et al., supra, at 3731, 3736 tbl.1. 
 91.  Cf. LAPIRA & THOMAS, supra note 19, at 47–50 (summarizing common tasks of lobbyists). 
 92.  Shobe, supra note 78, at 846. 
YIN_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2018  12:55 PM 
No. 2 2018]              TAX LEGISLATION IN A HIGHLY POLARIZED CONGRESS 269 
 
legislation is and will be more difficult to enact. The other developments reducing 
committee influence and the legislative branch’s expertise have had a similar 
effect. 
The decline of structural tax legislation may be just one example of a larger 
phenomenon. Reduction in congressional oversight during periods when the 
executive and legislative branches are controlled by the same party may also be 
attributable to the perception by strong partisans that the task is high-cost and 
low-benefit. Yet: 
There is . . . a considerable price to be paid for abdicating oversight. A salutary wariness 
about possible congressional oversight keeps executive agencies, appointees, and the 
president himself on their toes. Some of the crony appointments and misguided 
decisions . . . might never have been made had there been at least a fear of oversight . . 
. . [C]areful examination of how well [big changes in government organization] 
subsequently work is essential to good government.93 
Finally, the changes in Congress may have had collateral effects in the private 
sector. In the past, groups like the American Law Institute (ALI) have put 
together thoughtful proposals to influence the development of structural 
legislation in the tax law. But from the organization’s website, it appears that the 
last completed federal income tax project was the reporter’s study on the taxation 
of private business enterprises issued in the late 1990s.94 Perhaps the project was 
viewed as so unsuccessful that the ALI lost interest in trying another. But it is 
also possible that the ALI’s perception of the legislative process has had some 
effect. ALI members are busy and probably unwilling to devote precious time 
working on projects that are unlikely to gain a thoughtful reception on Capitol 
Hill.95 
 
 93.  Sinclair, supra note 20, at 77. 
 94.  See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PAST AND PRESENT ALI PROJECTS 5 (July 2017), available at 
https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/5f/20/5f20bac1-76ce-4343-871f-05a9cec806bc/projects-past-
present-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KY8-SF4C] (last visited Feb. 20, 2018); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, REPORTERS’ STUDY (GEORGE K. YIN AND DAVID J. 
SHAKOW, REPORTERS, 1999); George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. 
TAX REV. 141 (1999); cf. Daniel Halperin, Saving the Income Tax: An Agenda for Research, 77 TAX 
NOTES 967, 968 (1997) (urging revival of the ALI approach); Lawrence Zelenak, The Almost-Restatement 
of Income Tax of 1954: When Tax Giants Roamed the Earth, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 709, 709–10 (2013) 
(describing ALI’s 1954 goal of providing an “improved and modernized income tax statute”). There is a 
current ALI restatement project on charitable nonprofit organizations. Earlier valuable projects, some 
involving collaboration with the JCT and Treasury staffs, dealt with partnership tax, the income taxation 
of trusts and estates, the estate and gift tax, corporate acquisitions and dispositions, corporate integration, 
and international aspects of the income tax. 
 95.  A similar indication is the apparent discontinuation of any congressionally-initiated 
collaborative tax projects involving practitioners, academics, and government representatives. These 
projects also have generally tried to improve structural features of the tax system. One of the last ones—
perhaps the last major one—was a 1985 project that proposed revisions to the tax rules relating to mergers 
and acquisitions and was based largely on an earlier ALI study. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 
99TH CONG., THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT OF 1985 (Comm. Print 1985); AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C (1982).  
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IV 
ILLUSTRATING THE HYPOTHESIS 
Because it is not possible to provide a precise definition of structural 
legislation and test the hypothesis in any systematic way, this section merely 
examines a few areas of the law, including amendments to subchapters S, K, and 
C of the Code—all areas with the type of provisions described as structural 
legislation—and legislative efforts to enact as positive law the titles of the U.S. 
Code, to see if the pattern of legal change conforms with the hypothesis. The 
codification effort is an example of structural legislation unconnected to major 
reform because it entails complex, technical work whose desired result is not to 
change tax law or policy. As reference, Table 2 summarizes the discussion in Part 
III.B. regarding the changes in professional tax staffs in Congress over the last 
approximately 100 years. In general, the hypothesis is that as the legislative 
process has become more dominated by partisan legislators and staffers, such as 
during period IV, there should be fewer examples of structural change.96 “Fewer” 
is a comparative term and a more rigorous examination (if the data were 
available) would compare the productivity of structural and non-structural 
legislation during these periods. 
 
Table 2: Changes in Staff Helping Congress Develop Tax Legislation, 1913–Present 
Period Approximate years Tax staff 
I 1913–1926 Treasury only 
II 1927–1975 Treasury and JCT only 
III 1976–1990 Treasury, JCT and mostly nonpartisan other 
staffs 
IV 1991–present Treasury, JCT and mostly partisan other staffs 
 
A. Subchapter S 
Subchapter S was enacted in 1958.97 That bill was major reform, and not 
structural legislation unrelated to reform, since it changed policy to let certain 
corporations elect to avoid paying tax and to pass through their income and losses 
to their shareholders. The bill provided tax relief because it permitted 
shareholders to deduct corporate losses, allowed corporate income of low-
bracket shareholders to be taxed at rates less than the corporate rate (52%), and 
continued to let corporate income of high-bracket shareholders (subject to rates 
up to 91%) to be taxed at only 52% if their corporations did not make the 
election. Congress provided a crude mechanism that allowed electing 
corporations to treat both distributed and undistributed corporate income as 
 
 96.  The claim is limited to the existence of structural legislation and not necessarily its quality. The 
soundness of a change from a policy standpoint may depend on factors not considered in this article. 
 97.  See Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 1606, 1650 (1958). 
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dividends (with resulting basis adjustments) and to pass through losses (limited 
to shareholder basis).98 The income pass-through roughly previewed the 
controlled foreign corporation legislation that would be approved in 1962.99 
The 1982 revision of subchapter S, however, was structural legislation 
unrelated to major reform.100 Although passed in period III, it had its origins in a 
period II JCT report recommending structural improvements to subchapter S.101 
When an attorney who worked on that report became chief of staff in 1977, the 
staff returned to the project and prepared another report in 1980 on the same 
topic.102 Among the 1982 changes were to have subchapter S follow more closely 
the pure conduit model and to address some issues presented by S corporations 
with a prior history as a C corporation.103 
Since the early 1990s, not much has happened to subchapter S. Congress 
approved in 2002 the rule closing the loophole created by the Supreme Court in 
Gitlitz,104 amended in 2006 the basis adjustment rule for charitable contributions 
of appreciated property,105 and enacted various S corporation eligibility 
expansions, although these expansions would not seem to qualify as structural 
changes.106 
In the proper environment, important improvements to subchapter S could 
be made, including curbing the avoidance of employment and net investment 
income taxes using subchapter S,107 reexamining the one class of stock rules 
(including the disregard of certain stock rights for that purpose),108 providing a 
straightforward way to allow corporate debt to pass through to shareholder basis 
in the same manner as in subchapter K,109 and simplifying the law by imposing 
some type of C to S toll charge. There also remains question whether any eligible 
corporation should be allowed to elect out of subchapter S, effectively reversing 
 
 98.  For brief explanation, see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N, JCT-3-59, 85TH  
CONG., SUMMARY OF 1958 SMALL BUSINESS TAX LEGISLATION 3–6 (Comm. Print 1959). 
 99.  See Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12(a), 76 Stat. 960, 1006 (1962). 
 100.  See Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982). 
 101.  The report was never released to the public but was briefly referenced in a closed 1969 hearing. 
See Briefing on Tax Reform Act of 1969 Before S. Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong. 102 (1969) (statement 
of Laurence N. Woodworth).  
 102.  See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-24-80, 96TH CONG., STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
SIMPLIFICATION OF TAX RULES RELATING TO SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1980). 
 103.  See H.R. REP. NO. 97-826, at 13–19 (1982); S. REP. NO. 97-640, at 14–20 (1982).  
 104.  See I.R.C. § 108(d)(7)(A); Gitlitz v. Comm’r, 531 U.S. 206 (2001) (interpreting statute as 
permitting conversion of tax-deferred income into tax-exempt income). 
 105.  See I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2) (last sentence). 
 106.  See I.R.C. § 1361. 
 107.  See Karen C. Burke, Exploiting the Medicare Tax Loophole (Sept. 22, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3041694 [https://perma.cc/SE8B-
YGW8]. The same problem may arise for businesses organized as limited liability companies taxed as 
partnerships.  
 108.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(4)(iii)(C); Notice 2004-30, 2004-1 C.B. 828. 
 109.  See I.R.C. § 752. 
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one of the relief aspects of the 1958 legislation.110 The principal portion of the 
2017 tax bill affecting passthrough entities, including S corporations, LLCs, and 
partnerships, is not structural legislation unrelated to reform since it tries to make 
a major change in policy, although the precise policy objective is very hard to 
discern.111 
B. Subchapter K 
Congress enacted many core provisions of subchapter K in 1954 with help 
from the ALI and other private lawyers.112 There has been a lot of development 
since then, although much of it in the regulations. Congress approved changes in 
1976 and 1984 that led to extensive regulations under sections 704(b) and 752, 
respectively.113 Congress also passed structural legislation (and authorized more 
regulations) in amending sections 704(c), 706, 707, and 724 during the mid-1980s, 
section 704(c) again in the late 1980s, and section 737 in the early 1990s.114 
Since then, again, not much structural legislation has been passed. Congress 
added the marketable security rule (section 731(c)) in 1994, the section 732(c) 
basis allocation rules in 1997, a small 1999 loophole closer relating to the basis in 
stock of a corporation controlled by a corporate partner, and 2004 changes 
primarily to prevent loss duplication.115 Nothing has approached the 1999 ALI 
Reporters’ Study recommendations to tax partnership distributions and 
restructure the taxation of private businesses more generally.116 The 
tremendously important partnership allocation rules remain an unsatisfactory 
muddle. Treasury appears to have fixed the longstanding flaws in section 751(b), 
but not with the help of any new legislation.117 Revising the taxation of carried 
interests, another long-term tax problem, may no longer qualify as structural 
 
 110.  Cf. George K. Yin, Corporate Tax Reform, Finally, After 100 Years, in TOWARD TAX REFORM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TASK FORCE 114 (Tax Analysts 2009). 
 111.  See Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11011, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (adding new I.R.C. § 199A).  
 112.  See Mark P. Gergen, The Story of Subchapter K: Mark H. Johnson’s Quest, in BUSINESS TAX 
STORIES 207 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005); Zelenak, supra note 94, at 710. 
 113.  See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 213(d), 90 Stat. 1520, 1548 (1976); Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 79, 98 Stat. 494, 597 (1984); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1, 1.704-2, 
1.752-1, 1.752-2, 1.752-3.  
 114.  See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 71(a), 98 Stat. 494, 589 (§ 704(c)) (1984); 
id.,§ 72(a), 98 Stat. at 589 (§ 706(d)); id., § 73(a), 98 Stat. at 591 (§ 707(a)); id., § 74(a), 98 Stat. at 592 (§ 
724); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 806(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2362 (§ 706(b)) (1986); 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7642(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (§ 
704(c)) (1989); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1937(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 3032 (§ 737) 
(1992).  
 115.  See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 741(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 5006 (§ 
731(c)) (1994); Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1061(a), 111 Stat. 788, 945 (§ 732(c)) 
(1997); Tax Relief Extension Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 538(a), 113 Stat. 1860, 1939 (§ 732(f)) 
(1999); American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 833, 118 Stat. 1418, 1589 (§§ 734, 
743) (2004). 
 116.  See ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 94. 
 117.  See REG-151416-06, 2014-47 I.R.B. 870.  
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legislation since the issue has become a poster child for favoritism to private 
equity and the wealthy.118 The 2015 change to the partnership audit rules 
previewed the manner Congress passed the 2017 tax bill and seems characteristic 
of what can be expected during period IV—hastily drafted and technically 
dubious legislation produced with little advance public knowledge or input.119 
C. Subchapter C 
Subchapter C draws many of its roots from period I when Congress generally 
followed the recommendations of the Treasury. Some of those rules were quite 
crude yet remain in the law despite many proposals, especially during the 1970s 
and 1980s, to undertake major revision.120 Congress added section 306 in 1954 
and section 338 in 1982.121 Congress also had an on-again, off-again relationship 
with section 355, first adding it in 1918 and 1924 as an example of a qualifying 
reorganization exchange (but leaving open Mrs. Gregory’s loophole), then 
partially repealing it in 1934 when reorganizations came into some disfavor, and 
then reenacting it in 1951 and 1954 to reflect much of the law today.122 The last 
two major structural amendments to subchapter C were probably repeal of 
General Utilities and the rewriting of section 382, both passed in 1986 and drawing 
on the work of the ALI in the early 1980s.123 
In 2003, the George W. Bush Administration proposed enactment of 
corporate integration through dividend exclusion.124 Although this proposal was 
major reform and not a structural change unconnected to reform, it may be 
instructive to consider what happened to the period IV initiative. Congress 
favored its policy effect of reducing taxation of corporate-source income but 
could not resolve some technical aspects, such as determining which corporations 
could pay excludible dividends, since only dividends of previously taxed 
 
 118.  See Alec MacGillis, The Billionaires’ Loophole, NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/david-rubenstein-and-the-carried-interest-dilemma 
[https://perma.cc/A8K9-KQR3]; James B. Stewart, The Birthday Party: How Stephen Schwarzman 
Became Private Equity’s Designated Villain, NEW YORKER (Feb. 11, 2008), https://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2008/02/11/the-birthday-party-2 [https://perma.cc/5NEB-ZLXB]. The 2017 tax act makes a 
minor change to the taxation of carried interests that should do little to solve the basic problem. See Pub. 
L. No. 115-97, § 13309 (2017). 
 119.  See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 1101(b)(1), 129 Stat. 584 (2015) (adding 
Code §§ 771-777). Extensive technical corrections to these provisions were enacted in early 2018. See 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, Div. U, §§ 201-207, 132 Stat. 348, 1171–
1183 (2018).  
 120.  See supra note 95. 
 121.  See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 306, 68A Stat. 3, 90 (1954); Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 224(a), 96 Stat. 324, 485 (1982).  
 122.  See Charles S. Whitman, III, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to Corporate 
Separations under the 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1194, 1198–1210 (1968). 
 123.  See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 621(a), 631, 100 Stat. 2085, 2254, 2269 (1986); 
ALI FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, supra note 95.  
 124.  See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL 
YEAR 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS 12–15 (2003).  
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corporate income qualified for exclusion. That condition had been included in 
the proposal partly to curb corporate tax shelters. Eventually, Congress settled 
on a simple rate cut for the dividend income of domestic individuals and applied 
the same rate to all long-term capital gain—not just gain from corporate stock 
dispositions.125 Congress, thus, accepted and expanded the tax relief of the 
proposal, took a step towards structural improvement by conforming the taxation 
of corporate source income of shareholders who are domestic individuals, but 
declined the proposal’s attempt to achieve broader structural reform. 
Many parts of subchapter C are in need of structural improvement. The 
acquisitive reorganization rules remain impossible to rationalize.126 In addition, 
sections 302, 304, 306, and 355 were all designed in part to prevent conversion of 
dividend income into preferentially-taxed long-term capital gain. None has been 
updated to reflect the 2003 rate conformity of those two types of income for 
domestic individuals.127 Meanwhile, collateral rules, such as the section 318 
constructive ownership rules that are generally tilted towards protecting dividend 
characterization of a transaction, may now primarily serve as strategic 
opportunities for taxpayers benefiting from that characterization.128 Section 355 
has also never been carefully reworked to adapt to the repeal of General Utilities 
in 1986, with sections 355(d), (e), and (g), passed in 1990, 1997, and 2006, all 
representing large patches to an obsolete underlying structure.129 
In fact, section 355 may not just be out-of-date and include some unnecessary 
conditions; it may now be exactly backwards. Because of the “device” clause, the 
law has long given close to a free pass to non-pro-rata separations.130 But 
presently, because of other changes in the law, the biggest threat to the fisc from 
a corporate division may well be a non-pro-rata transaction that constitutes a 
disguised exchange.131 It might make sense to flip current law on its head to favor 
pro-rata separations and disfavor non-pro-rata ones. 
D. Enacting the Titles of the U.S. Code as Positive Law 
A final illustration involves the ongoing congressional effort to enact the titles 
of the U.S. Code as positive law. Congress approved the code in 1926 as only 
prima facie evidence of the law. As a result, the statutes underlying the code were 
not repealed and in the event of conflict, the statutes take precedence over the 
 
 125.  See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 301, 302, 117 
Stat. 752, 758, 760 (2003). 
 126.  See I.R.C. § 368; supra note 95.  
     127.    See Bret Wells, Reform of Corporate Distributions in Subchapter C, 37 VA. TAX REV. 365, 368 
(2018) (describing existing corporate distribution provisions as “public nuisance”). 
 128.  See I.R.S. Notice 2001-45, 2001-2 C.B. 129 (describing opportunistic use of option attribution 
rule). 
    129.  See Herbert N. Beller, Section 355 Revisited: Time for a Major Overhaul?, 72 TAX LAW. 
(forthcoming 2018) (urging major overhaul of provision) 
 130.  See Rev. Rul. 64-102, 1964-1 C.B. 136; Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(5).  
 131.  See I.R.C. § 355(g); GEORGE K. YIN & KAREN C. BURKE, CORPORATE TAXATION 502–04 (2d 
ed. 2016).  
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code. Congress took this action out of concern that the 1926 codification 
contained errors and was incomplete. A similar set of concerns had arisen during 
the 1870s when Congress undertook an earlier effort to codify the federal 
statutes. The expectation after 1926 was to enact each title as positive law, and 
repeal its underlying statutes, once Congress was confident the title was accurate 
and complete.132 
Codifying the federal statutes and enacting a title as positive law is a prime 
example of structural legislation because it is a technically challenging revision 
without any intended change to the law represented by the underlying statutes. 
The JCT staff spent about a dozen years working on codifying the tax statutes 
and when the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 was enacted, it became the first 
portion of the U.S. Code to be approved as positive law.133 
Although the discussion in this essay has focused on changes in the tax 
legislative environment and therefore may not be relevant to the production of 
legislation in other areas of the law, it may, nevertheless, be useful to examine 
the pace of enacting the U.S. Code titles as positive law to see whether it 
conforms to the basic hypothesis. Presently, exactly half of the fifty-six titles of 
the U.S. Code have been enacted as positive law.134 Table 3 provides the timing 
of those enactments since 1926 and shows the total number of pages of the titles 
enacted and the yearly averages to estimate the approximate amount of work 
accomplished in each period.135 As is shown, the pace of work has definitely 
slackened during period IV. There obviously may be reasons for this 
phenomenon quite apart from the hypothesis. 
 
Table 3: Enactments of U.S. Code Titles as Positive Law 
Period Dates # Years Positive Law Enactments 
   # titles titles/year pages pages/year 
I 1913–1926 14 0 0 0 0 
II 1927–1975 49 19 0.39 11719 239 
III 1976–1990 15 4 0.27 2732 182 
IV 1991–2017 27 5 0.19 969 36 
 
 
 132.  For background, see Yin, supra note 65. 
 133.  In addition to helping users, enactment of a title as positive law benefits legislators and staff by 
simplifying the process of approving subsequent amendments. See id. For this reason, one might expect 
codification legislation to be a higher priority for Congress than other structural legislation without this 
attribute. 
 134.  This count includes the tax title (Title 26) as positive law, even though the U.S. Code does not 
so indicate. See United States Code (2012 ed.). For the explanation, see Yin, supra note 65.  
 135.  A listing of each title, its page length, and positive law status (and date of enactment) is included 
in the Appendix. 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
Changes in the tax legislative process, including particularly the greater 
dominance of partisan legislators and staffers during the last twenty-five to thirty 
years, have made it more difficult to enact structural tax legislation that is not 
part of a major reform. Such legislation potentially improves the execution of 
current policies by advancing the efficiency, equity, or administrability of existing 
law. But because the legislation is complex and generally has modest policy 
significance, it has limited appeal to strong partisans interested in achieving a 
major policy change. Thus, a decline in the production of structural legislation 
may be a natural outgrowth of changing legislator and staff interests and 
incentives during the past twenty-five to thirty years. 
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APPENDIX136 
This appendix lists the title number, name, page length, and positive law 
status (including date of enactment) of each title of the U.S. Code. Page length is 
based on either the 2012 edition of the U.S. Code or the U.S. Code supplement 
III, vol. IV (2016) for titles added since 2012. For date of positive law enactments, 
see 1 U.S.C. § 204 note. 
 
TITLE NUMBER & 
NAME PAGES POSITIVE ENACTED 
1. General Provisions 16 Y 1947 
2. The Congress 612   
3. The President 61 Y 1948 
4. Flag and Seal, Seat of 
Government, and the 
States 21 Y 1947 
5. Government 
Organization and 
Employees; and Appendix 589 Y 1966 
6. Domestic Security 273 **  
7. Agriculture 2015 
8. Aliens and Nationality 540 
9. Arbitration 7 Y 1947 
10. Armed Forces 2555 Y 1956 
11. Bankruptcy; and 
Appendix 457 Y 1978 
12. Banks and Banking 1948   
13. Census 38 Y 1954 
14. Coast Guard 151 Y 1949 
15. Commerce and Trade 2105   
16. Conservation 2485   
17. Copyrights 203 Y 1947 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    136.   Certain titles (designated by “**”) are undergoing revision for codification as positive law. Title 
35 is positive law but is under revision. See OFF. OF THE L. REVISION COUNCIL, U.S. CODE, POSITIVE 
LAW CODIFICATION, http://uscode.house.gov/codification/legislation.shtml#current_plaw [https:// 
perma.cc/B9DF-BN9U] (last visited Feb. 20, 2018). 
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TITLE NUMBER & 
NAME PAGES POSITIVE ENACTED 
18. Crimes and Criminal 
Procedure; and Appendix 1044 Y 1948 
19. Customs Duties 1021   
20. Education 1675   
21. Food and Drugs 770   
22. Foreign Relations and 
Intercourse 1781   
23. Highways 348 Y 1958 
24. Hospitals and Asylums 45   
25. Indians 891   
26. Internal Revenue Code 3870 Y137 1939 
27. Intoxicating Liquors 20   
28. Judiciary and Judicial 
Procedure; and Appendix 1075 Y 1948 
29. Labor 792   
30. Mineral Lands and 
Mining 361 
31. Money and Finance 500 Y 1982 
32. National Guard 53 Y 1956 
33. Navigation and 
Navigable Waters 759   
34. [Navy: This titled 
eliminated by Title 10] 0   
35. Patents 141 Y 1952 
36. Patriotic and Natl 
Observances, Ceremonies, 
and Organizations 298 Y 1998 
37. Pay and Allowances of 
the Uniformed Services 261 Y 1962 
38. Veterans' Benefits 1001 Y 1958 
39. Postal Service 124 Y 1960 
40. Public Buildings, 
Property, and Works 235 Y 2002 
41. Public Contracts 149 Y 2011 
 
 
 
    137.   See supra note 134.  
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TITLE NUMBER & 
NAME PAGES POSITIVE ENACTED 
42. The Public Health and 
Welfare 8271   
43. Public Lands 581   
44. Public Printing and 
Documents 161 Y 1968 
45. Railroads 268   
46. Shipping 461 Y 1983 
47. Telecommunications 399   
48. Territories and Insular 
Possessions 309   
49. Transportation 1314 Y 1978 
50. War and National 
Defense; and Appendix 968   
51. National and 
Commercial Space 
Programs 135 Y 2010 
52. Voting and Elections 135 
53. Small Business unknown ** 
54. National Park Service 
and Related Programs 152 Y 2014 
55. Environment unknown **  
56. Wildlife unknown **  
 
 
 
